Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d33e9c67e5469144…

MALICIOUS

PDF

41.0 KB Created: 2020-09-02 05:20:46 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: e3c23a0ab84a7e2b512b53fca2bff5de SHA-1: be3460196fddb917b7878b87130228e598589681 SHA-256: d33e9c67e54691444f36a8b9e999e396d5cd379728bfab285a819d1f752ef549
162 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.001 Malicious Link T1566.002 Spearphishing Link

The PDF document contains a lure for remote support software, instructing the user to install or connect with tools like TeamViewer. It embeds a link that redirects to a malicious URL, likely to deliver a secondary payload or phish for credentials. The PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK heuristic confirms the malicious nature of the redirector.

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Remote-support tool lure high SE_REMOTE_SUPPORT_LURE
    Document instructs the user to install, open, or connect with a remote-support tool such as AnyDesk, TeamViewer, Quick Assist, or ScreenConnect — high-risk in an unsolicited document
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/wix?keyword=teamviewer+13+for+android
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/1820/6888/files/86810032681.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/5857/7046/files/reunion_de_alma_ata_1978.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/7449/4369/files/jexozi.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/1792/7837/files/55396185473.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/6079/6318/files/kolatovofusifesebega.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/0599/3375/files/sazamobapexabudurabokod.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/8361/9736/files/pipuvej.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0464/6325/4680/files/datetimepicker_android_example.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0450/6199/6694/files/boring_machine_types.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/5105/6285/files/tupepinalepeditu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/4282/4614/files/deferred_tax_calculation_balance_sheet_approach_example.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_6336458b2b384417acd3f79f3e1a4aa3.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/3826db_61a923e20b5849e2bcda30af1b94d13b.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/e643da_ee81c335dbc74a238fa6ca6cf439251e.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006392.bin
6d6a5191b6099c8e1f053b2f5333efbfb20ae13bba7344e65d3ba65addcd683c		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6392 5160 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00007528.bin
a681caa59a7188364c05b0c88f30fb5802d539bfaac3ab50e2001c7ee7bd1467		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7528 9808 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.