Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d3196a6263e06f1a…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

967.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2024-06-11
MD5: ff21d77f93158551c7f160787042b95a SHA-1: 20b56ba2a9e5a066a26b8d69ebe13ea9923d122d SHA-256: d3196a6263e06f1acc80912174bb1dbeabde9ca89f0145db010a1a905ec61a62
70 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The critical heuristic firing indicates exploitation of CVE-2017-0199 via an OLE2Link object, which attempts to download a remote payload from http://gf.to/DVzooCxrr. Although the VBA project contains no executable statements, the presence of the exploit and the embedded URL strongly suggest a malicious downloader. The file is an Excel spreadsheet, which is a common delivery mechanism for such exploits.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.day.com/dam/1.0
    • http://gf.to/DVzooCxrr
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/tiff/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes