RTF malware analysis — malicious · d313021c2d82399a

MALICIOUS

RTF

29.1 KB First seen: 2022-11-16

MD5: a32832390e0f17462ed051596b677931 SHA-1: 2aa6ee414aca3364431913a56afbdd16d9bb9b35 SHA-256: d313021c2d82399a673f8aee4debe06a81254e56a2225ba7e8ceda85d6d950bb

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object specifically targeting the Equation Editor, as indicated by the RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics. The SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristic confirms the presence of a lure to enable editing, which would activate the embedded object. This combination strongly suggests an exploit delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00005991.bin` `d62b038208915af38fad61f95f134b4ac2e11b584b1268b41f6d01459ea16a47`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x5991	1512 bytes

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