Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d3075897818a1e4a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

91.9 KB Created: 2021-09-02 06:54:01 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-05
MD5: b1297b161d27dc2c7e5b7479cf1fda25 SHA-1: fdba37dd9f7f86424f4dd2b4bdaa31eb038e941a SHA-256: d3075897818a1e4a70e28d1ff7af190d9a9d0d8ce51fc06b474c78ec2e47814f
212 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF was detected as malicious by ML classifiers and ClamAV, indicating a phishing and potential trojan delivery attempt. It contains numerous links, some pointing to compromised CMS uploads and disposable hosting, designed to trick users with urgency and brand impersonation lures. Although no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded links suggest it's intended to lead users to malicious sites for credential harvesting or further payload delivery.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9987

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Brand-impersonation credential phishing lure high SE_BRAND_CREDENTIAL_PHISH
    Document impersonates a well-known consumer brand and uses account-security / verification language ('unusual activity', 'account on hold', 'verify your account') to steer the reader to a credential-harvesting link. Corroborated by: call-to-action link host does not match the impersonated brand: https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/3vuEKuznOb8/uplcv?utm_term=barre3+instructor+training.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://aktifimmo.lu/userfiles/files/43290246939.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://atolab.it/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/42586a356f0477fde3865e0cbe30abac/37376502850.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://elite-nails.pl/Upload/file/magiwifirixoremojo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.sensiblemachines.com/ckfinder/core/connector/php/files/11412750276.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.sabiamente.es/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16073c4dfe1a33---todelazox.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.oknookna.pl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160adbb87b1fef---vepareziludelo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://technoarc.net/userfiles/file/suxagufozafep.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sbstroy53.ru/img/files/zilisuvavaputilupirobaguv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://linhngapt.vn/upload/files/11683255616.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gotoko.com/cmsv2/upload/files/17809988164.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://antoinepanau.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7ac5e82e7cba492176fc3c67ea91e63f/vudoz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lignumweb.com/site/webroot/uploads/files/zugejidigazajur.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://twinslock.com/locktactyuma/userfiles/file/78432508403.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pinpointfeedtech.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/26734194339.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://stroykap.com/application/views/stroykap/userfiles/file/79282136840.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://konyaalotaksi.com/userfiles/file/59632288242.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://digimaap.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/klch79r6o59btjltpih4muo3qs/79216283977.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://flightshop.jp/images/blog//file/xotusir.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lafayetteconnections.com/clients/52818/File/jijapopug.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lalitas-thaimassage-spa.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160afff920a745---47109160921.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://beming.com/ressource/site-image/files/3133705168.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ksuskalology.com/images/file/nigeboji.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/3vuEKuznOb8/uplcv?utm_term=barre3+instructor+trainingPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0001000c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1000C 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0001181e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1181E 18700 bytes
SHA-256: 1a2dbf8427a4982acc26debf70d8e345ad71b295df5676ac57238aef3a2d5d08
font_02_sfnt_off00014863.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x14863 10684 bytes
SHA-256: bae3080f8cae357d4e21e940404e99c1bc395595d047e0c55c1a1c2c1c297351

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