Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d2ecf5fb9e5fd609…

MALICIOUS

RTF

11.2 KB First seen: 2019-05-31
MD5: 286a785beafa4dc9fcb6a9e36a56cca9 SHA-1: 482b5e1dc273055fe6c570bcc3818d28eb6a30ab SHA-256: d2ecf5fb9e5fd6097de3d13871be759595661b9a374d4309d826a315265e8451
280 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that exploits the Equation Editor vulnerability CVE-2017-11882. This vulnerability is known to be used for arbitrary code execution, likely to download and run a secondary payload. The presence of the Equation Editor CLSID and the specific font record overflow pattern strongly indicate this exploit.

Heuristics 6

  • Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882
    Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Exploit.CVE_2017_11882-6934206-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Exploit.CVE_2017_11882-6934206-0
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000105e.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x105E 3620 bytes
SHA-256: 97b9c846264392121842c2fd550d3e11978f1451147a149a17d634bce44f1744