Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d2ebb16b416dd2b6…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

887.5 KB First seen: 2022-05-25
MD5: ae38442c98e5a1bb5565e245eafc1921 SHA-1: 7ee2ce97ba8f5754fea435770d9195a0a9c597d4 SHA-256: d2ebb16b416dd2b6cae5bc98d2e634c727198031c5c3fb3ec30a7cd930ea1e3b
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious File T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution: Malicious Attachment

The primary heuristic firing indicates the presence of an Equation Editor OLE object, a known method for delivering exploits. The document body is heavily corrupted and unreadable, providing no further context. No scripts were extracted from this sample. The attack pattern is inferred from the presence of the vulnerable OLE object.

Heuristics 2

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ole10native_00.bin ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: olE10naTiVE 899270 bytes
SHA-256: 4e5693f520a050f7dcdf591255ff941cd7c6c44750ca1ca3ec718d93602799d6