Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d2e4fa4a6c7bdd33…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

59.0 KB First seen: 2023-03-08
MD5: dfce25f516c6e9d9f167f231491ceef7 SHA-1: 7dccb349a90b44d3959fa8060966394b3459f2cc SHA-256: d2e4fa4a6c7bdd33830347689119280de15ce7a62882abb669f1fab51a7786d8
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, indicated by RTF_OBJDATA and RTF_OLE10NATIVE_STREAM heuristics. The RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristic suggests that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically. The SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristic confirms that the document contains a prompt to 'Enable editing', a common social engineering tactic to bypass macro security. The document body discusses financial statements and auditors, likely a pretext to trick the user into enabling editing and triggering the malicious OLE object.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native stream in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_OLE10NATIVE_STREAM
    RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an Ole10Native stream. This is a strong payload-container signal and is related to Word/OLE exploit delivery, but it is not specific enough on its own to assign a CVE.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00002b47.bin
0b49df7e4e97cf9fefae8992009011df4013b082dee31985dc72fce7674bb08b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2B47 4168 bytes