RTF malware analysis — malicious · d2d74a31f2de4018

MALICIOUS

RTF

35.4 KB First seen: 2023-07-09

MD5: 325fb5e2010dee354704202ba9c6cf7b SHA-1: f6f9e67cab5e36e731096ee394c48f72f9dac92e SHA-256: d2d74a31f2de401802f0c467b41377f4a96e52eef8e4b8fe1e75ee9e75e6ac0a

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 User Execution: Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The RTF document contains an OLE object with an embedded Equation Editor, triggered by \objupdate, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', a common tactic to bypass security measures and facilitate exploitation. The presence of the Equation Editor exploit suggests the file is designed to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00004740.bin` `e12a1b643baee6e26df2099aa3e5ba2539b50894b393efec1194a1fbf708251b`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x4740	1908 bytes

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