Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d2cadaa8739cc88e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.64 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2026-06-19
MD5: 269aaf49378accc2f8f6c6450d1be02c SHA-1: 7b9bc4075756ab0e0cf327ccbe5cd3efa8ad1c18 SHA-256: d2cadaa8739cc88e18a237efc305c1c11b2848881dcfde3b4978c23314c823b1
128 Risk Score

Heuristics 6

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements info OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://getabre.com/HRAIGj In document text (OLE body)
    • http://evertype.comhttp://tulrich.comCopyrightIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/metadata/longPropertiesIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/customXmlIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/metadata/contentTypeIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/metadata/properties/metaAttributesIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/metadata/propertiesIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchemaIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/sharepoint/v3In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/documentManagement/typesIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/metadata/core-propertiesIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instanceIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://purl.org/dc/terms/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/internal/2005/internalDocumentationIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://dublincore.org/schemas/xmls/qdc/2003/04/02/dc.xsdIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://dublincore.org/schemas/xmls/qdc/2003/04/02/dcterms.xsdIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLRupakaraRegularRupakaraIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
SHA-256: 7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisWorkbook"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020819-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet1"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet2"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet3"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
font_00_sfnt_off00001575.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1575 88240 bytes
SHA-256: 41c2901ebda5b5d79d4a68e71278578ac4fe004bea942385b0ed0c502c07b584
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001000.pdf polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1000 1715216 bytes
SHA-256: 5038d41b9fd713b61190e3dd4334f5afbe16f238a40d6e84620cd6f7dd26ea6b
polyglot_child_pdf_off00013200.pdf polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x13200 1640976 bytes
SHA-256: da3cd8f5784a995fe834a27ba2a5e079a62306ff2212486b1bd5d80a76bbac9f