Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d2a5be57181e2d01…

MALICIOUS

RTF

96.2 KB First seen: 2023-08-18
MD5: d5dd06ed2736825ba8db2fc103ee4b29 SHA-1: 11951a544b0d3bf914552e947e7933dac98f7d48 SHA-256: d2a5be57181e2d0112d9dc0c21ff340265b56c7078e83fb0d6db2d3bf537e8f9
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution: Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, and the document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'click Enable editing'. This combination strongly suggests a malicious document designed to exploit this vulnerability upon user interaction.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00003f6d.bin
543a136e42a7bcc2cc57aefd0abff17fb795538ab13c96597feaa30ed2913133
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3F6D 1628 bytes