Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d2a2dddc6aa7f8d2…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

535.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2022-11-07
MD5: 9ed525110aa9019a063c9794823e8ae8 SHA-1: 95d24ef525357f348e4592929d8899b7dec6769c SHA-256: d2a2dddc6aa7f8d2e431624cf6385e6120eb6227c66c982f92e926fdd758eb5d
108 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic

The critical heuristic firing for CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE indicates the exploitation of a known vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor. This vulnerability is commonly used to execute arbitrary code, likely leading to the download and execution of a secondary payload. No VBA macros were found to contain executable statements, suggesting the exploit is directly embedded within the OLE object.

Heuristics 3

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
da1d37c19c1f4a777c70352d60910eb1585ed27025204aa90ed4134c1203aa03
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD012584EB/Ole10NaTIVE 1567 bytes