Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d299ff524e1d1eba…

MALICIOUS

PDF

77.2 KB Created: 2021-01-01 07:45:00 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-27
MD5: 6af92f03a7929b0a4612cd5a0a7bec49 SHA-1: d04a86559b5f556562e3a67b43945f3e292716dd SHA-256: d299ff524e1d1eba25222a582a1ed08e5183c4f8dd217d506d826077183fa485
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains a large number of external links, many pointing to disposable hosting services and potentially malicious domains, indicating it's part of a link farm or SEO spam campaign. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely phishing or malware distribution. No scripts were extracted, but the structure suggests it's designed to lure users to external content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffset.ru/123?utm_term=old+country+banjo+songs PDF link annotation
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/sixojifez/iighjfn/juicy_fruit_commercial_1984.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nejalebemenogun.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070187/jadum-piwuxeniz-woxosezo-dajexizo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://judadumoxa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134718892/rafopim_mibidi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vonubaxuted.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131452839/76796.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/dufadafakuti/fhejejb/alto_odyssey_mod_apk_no_ads.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/vibifexode/gjjb7b6/graphic_design_print_portfolio_layout.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fogevama.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164507/gixetafo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dupasaku.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134235895/pulijoxitazalu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/sisaxu/english_spm_essay_questions_and_answers.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xisefowu/jasekojoteridumisuwolij.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/77ffd031-00b3-4822-91bc-6849aeb74b3a/the_ultimate_guide_to_the_presidents_episode_8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jefazaxal/sonudiwumadofa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/052d18f2-a244-46ea-9c50-ee2f95d0f9fa/us_history_eoc_assessment_practice_test_answers.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/8fa124df-be0d-4db9-9e36-ebba95120e30/68700639394.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f07c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF07C 5452 bytes
SHA-256: 77a28bedd605e9ed052f86430a5b67ac9a2c7aaaf89b3c25fefba111ba84649f
font_01_sfnt_off0001031b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1031B 10904 bytes
SHA-256: c00d214a79d0519a9feecfdb402ff2bd8f34a1115ccd3ee3165fb2eb784c8981

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