Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d298f6741d1e6df0…

MALICIOUS

RTF

1.55 MB Created: 2018-08-20 10:32:00 First seen: 2020-01-07
MD5: eca7e438ad10709a7f1816a406023a61 SHA-1: caed3687be32d80134c4efb1e0ed2e5c0d018cb7 SHA-256: d298f6741d1e6df0f9201d86e9bc89c29f0f37e3c437498f3f5471a56ad80fa0
182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains numerous OLE objects and uses \objupdate to force OLE activation, strongly indicating exploitation of CVE-2017-8759. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution when a vulnerable MSXML version processes the embedded OLE object, likely leading to the download and execution of a secondary payload. The presence of large hex data blocks within the OLE object further suggests the hiding of malicious content.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    RTF contains ~1007KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 24 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00002b69.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2B69 21569 bytes
SHA-256: 819ce217abbbb016bf8d58dac479b6ff77ec3f5457dd3e07bd683c9c0c97b124
objdata_09_off0009413e.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x9413E 21569 bytes
SHA-256: 91e8a85cb483cb8573109611c71454dd1dea22260537f6b5eb649ba163e01225
objdata_18_off00125713.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x125713 21569 bytes
SHA-256: 03f52aecea16ed27d48ea40dc4c7ab9791199cfdc7aeecb29cb829793b634bbc