Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d291d9cfa8fe4991…

MALICIOUS

RTF

6.2 KB First seen: 2019-04-18
MD5: 7b0a8aacb7ccb5b38fc7c8a0e45c8063 SHA-1: 928ee9cd0d0b8f6534ae05a764ce056b3422cae7 SHA-256: d291d9cfa8fe49912d4c13e9d932e6681e09a5cddfe21ad4442ba5620e7023e3
162 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains an OLE object that is automatically linked and updated, exploiting CVE-2017-0199. This vulnerability allows the file to fetch and execute a payload from the embedded URL http://avast.aandagroupbd.website/run.html. The exploit targets client execution and is likely delivered via spearphishing.

Heuristics 5

  • CVE-2017-0199 (OLE2Link / remote URL Moniker) critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    RTF contains a URL Moniker OLE link whose decoded target is remote. Office can fetch and process the response through the CVE-2017-0199 OLE2Link attack path, but the server-side content type is not proven statically.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://avast.aandagroupbd.website/run.html In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000003f.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3F 3133 bytes
SHA-256: cdcf6587a68f3571bea6d00f5ae56444a99bd1989224546575932f22fbdb1b77