Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCM — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d2809e3e60e5d967…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCM

103.4 KB Created: 2021-09-09 11:57:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2024-05-24
MD5: 513e8e3ede4f821dad0e3ba3448aca42 SHA-1: ddee9c679af1ca97f5834eaac5f010216fb0c9af SHA-256: d2809e3e60e5d9671be8644750ad1b385aaa6b4ff01fef8fc594d81c69275a33
302 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution: Malicious Macro T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is a macro-enabled document (DOCM) containing a Document_Open macro. This macro uses URLDownloadToFile to download a PowerShell script from 'http://45.140.147.81/doomsday.ps1' to 'C:\Users\Public\doomsday.ps1'. It then executes this script using 'POWERSHELL.exe'. The presence of the Document_Open macro, Shell() call, PowerShell reference, and URLDownloadToFile function strongly indicate a downloader or dropper functionality.

Heuristics 8

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • PowerShell reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_PS
    PowerShell reference in VBA
  • URLDownloadToFile in VBA critical OLE_VBA_DOWNLOAD
    URLDownloadToFile in VBA
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://45.140.147.81/doomsday.ps1
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
bb1bd439cab5f95aa2e1f8ece1414f032fbc919af79dab82c7604b40e2fff410		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 772 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
67c6731b2dd912ad397e9c9881efd6cd5b10c922882515370ae421ea7388a34c		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 10240 bytes

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