RTF malware analysis — malicious · d27174550c627e2a

MALICIOUS

RTF

6.0 KB

MD5: 9e1772002f8791df8ccc8534c234e971 SHA-1: c6f96ca18399b670f8721b85c8c86ededc7d079f SHA-256: d27174550c627e2ae425db9dc83ed7cb1856034184c6ce333efcf383506abd88

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object that leverages a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component. The ".objupdate" directive indicates that the OLE object is automatically activated upon opening the document, triggering the exploit. This is a common delivery mechanism for malware, aiming to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000004fc.bin` `8731385bc53fdcb417ac106bc9344a6349fc42df800bf51cbf2360a326cc5c89`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x4FC	1702 bytes

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