Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d2691b824851dee5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

74.5 KB Created: 2021-06-06 02:10:07 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-11-24
MD5: 12bab9b3df6f31c0df9f217aa01f6b43 SHA-1: 2c0bc41ddf5efb4b5b04241efb8666f7e440855f SHA-256: d2691b824851dee5f07ad60015a668fce9e34347756caed704525de33eb53be8
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file was flagged by multiple heuristics as a link farm and detected as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier. It contains numerous external links, many hosted on disposable domains like weebly.com, suggesting a phishing or malware distribution scheme. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, appears to reference 'answer key' content, a common lure for such attacks.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://smidgel.ru/pbw?utm_term=alfred%2527s+essentials+of+music+theory+answer+key+unit+10 PDF link annotation
    • https://tadafemuge.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134480681/74fc4b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kiforagog.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134732338/484944.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gebovobavafol.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406715/xaval.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://verefatodefi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134722939/fotavipixodoka-jatuniro-golegur-tasaxuso.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wuwuxetu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134897280/6361770.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://marezupudi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874377/807256.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tufibexewati.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134583298/nizagobu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rigavimiba.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814992/3691039.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tujobofawoti.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695409/570346.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jajibesuwazigix.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383486/zikunegemagup_kubesu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vokobilozo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134235622/97ceb1d14da4a7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • http://togiwuvoze.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/144470535/chapter_18_viruses_and_bacteria_chapter_assessment_answer_key.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mogulazedub.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/144497814/kurinurubedi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dejulagimu.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/144559236/pifudanedu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://redelaw.pbworks.com/f/8935405914.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zizovitunex.pbworks.com/f/61449873931.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://felefejimax.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/144564663/46435580950.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://buwutel.pbworks.com/f/who_is_the_ugliest_kpop_girl_group.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pafesudive.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/144690072/8460574211.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zezimin.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/144670461/42592805937.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d606.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD606 5620 bytes
SHA-256: f4f9beb0a5d72fe02eac9d9ab91775b665e6d78da1df1664828e4c0906e103c2
font_01_sfnt_off0000e910.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE910 10908 bytes
SHA-256: 67f65ba0198540a22ae5b1b9f15fafb379617fa7f328a0f61fb4ba4ee0023fb2
font_02_sfnt_off00010e0d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10E0D 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 0d0f64e27578eb124b8bc81c7eceacdd166e22eddd95c81328e9fbd7de2a6333