Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d262956eb058ab4f…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

29.0 KB
MD5: b2f9f9c05d2b2894983a5f33af5b1626 SHA-1: fc018cef3413157d4ee3f13ec2944e638445b38f SHA-256: d262956eb058ab4fa1d3a6852053585ffea1bb7afd2ebb5693927a7f5ca79292
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE objects and triggers an update via \objupdate. Crucially, it fires the RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR heuristic, indicating exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability. This technique is commonly used to download and execute a second-stage payload, leading to a high confidence in a malicious intent.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000019e3.bin
8aa4d38fad67956dd38a1fdf1510374f07f7455eccc838600e67047f9e57dafc
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x19E3 1768 bytes