Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d23ae849bf9f660d…

MALICIOUS

RTF

11.4 KB
MD5: 07f30943b1cad4bcb7b3fdf5ef36604a SHA-1: d7db457d08e2e792adae0dfce131f706eadef2d8 SHA-256: d23ae849bf9f660d0b0439c726786db1f941caebdd3615e4325db10e81d73349
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability (RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR). The ".objupdate" directive indicates that the OLE object is designed to be activated automatically upon opening, which is a common technique for exploiting such vulnerabilities. This exploit likely serves to download and execute a secondary payload, although no specific download URLs or script content were extracted from this sample. The confidence is high due to the clear exploitation of a known vulnerability.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000184c.bin
924deb115980ce4c69d7a121f49035166d77b91bf19dd08615f9e1ad13ca99c4
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x184C 2022 bytes