RTF malware analysis — malicious · d232f97ce48b8a6c

MALICIOUS

RTF

84.5 KB First seen: 2024-09-23

MD5: ff64b33fa40cc3a4224a944bb5eb0d0b SHA-1: 3ef42ff1e0d4c3493ed1bb6bf66791af8e144e7a SHA-256: d232f97ce48b8a6cc2846028e470b5d069af480f8449de8c3cbfacc5fd5c2a22

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: Malicious Code

The sample is an RTF document that leverages a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component. The presence of \objdata and \objupdate heuristics strongly suggests the embedded OLE object is designed to be activated, likely to download and execute a secondary payload. The specific exploit targeted is identified as Equation Editor, a common vector for initial compromise.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001839.bin` `29361ebdce224c7bef366c473e12b4eeb6c813b05b5f6221af4bd4e3eeb3bbc4`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1839	1535 bytes

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