Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d1e9ced10dd69d10…

MALICIOUS

RTF

3.8 KB
MD5: 23c2b1dbda59d01d21014fb248760f7f SHA-1: 91ba6f9702434df1ef66159f8886b7dd9957f803 SHA-256: d1e9ced10dd69d104606fc3b92ca5a1b2d1a56e6d727b788f403ecedb05920d1
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR heuristic, indicating exploitation of a vulnerability within the Equation Editor component. The ".objupdate" directive further suggests that the embedded object is designed to be activated, leading to arbitrary code execution. This is a common technique for delivering malicious payloads via document attachments.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000b2.bin
c9505bbaa14b1eeed101b3ab48159722ebeef75a5c2298a57e7331727d8a1c08		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB2 1758 bytes

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