Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d1ce1852810767ea…

MALICIOUS

PDF

45.8 KB Created: 2020-08-05 08:17:37 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2026-05-09
MD5: d932a2ed53e9e89a8fe52e5ea715d46e SHA-1: 883b1da89b9faa62bca22728cb356d6121cba8f3 SHA-256: d1ce1852810767eaf5cec3fc5ec10d28f580a0477c3f65f76f3b7c2a32a00ee8
194 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a link to a redirector service, which is a common technique for distributing malware. The document body itself contains obfuscated text and multiple URLs, including one pointing to a known malicious redirector. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness. The primary attack vector appears to be a lure for downloading a fake manual, which then redirects to malicious infrastructure.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/pify?keyword=altium+designer+17+manual+pdf In PDF document text
    • http://files.cindyannebroz.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379371/3358048.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.salesmeddic.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874620/25f29.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.delcocheetahcat.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132303170/jokogu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/4573/9941/files/7149646699.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/7263/4533/files/febinugi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/6630/2359/files/50224906435.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0127/3758/files/xuwejugalafop.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/7287/1832/files/gagozobevusubok.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/6385/2712/files/90335927737.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/9144/3364/files/71936488161.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/5857/7056/files/zebik.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/6020/8540/files/nageke.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/7695/1965/files/wedubaderasazobal.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/sarozasupevukofapunaxovu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/5588/3175/files/pujikokilimavotor.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/1334/0312/files/32360671381.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/7510/7992/files/somomo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text
🗂 Part of campaign: deathandseparationbook.com 3 samples

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006113.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6113 5252 bytes
SHA-256: 4cea4de7666dca89ffe9ebc6906c7a4e36941ff398afe4fc6f715e5b8f9b73b2
font_01_sfnt_off000072da.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x72DA 12980 bytes
SHA-256: 0483f562bc736fd9fee911846a2a39bb86aee0347002d50e329be010ac20ad4e
font_02_sfnt_off00009c46.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9C46 4324 bytes
SHA-256: ff5f0ef16caf3e97cd1984b3a03ea88e11eab8cf63d2ee006085a4b9995833f3