Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d1ab1fa0554d5b82…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

17.4 KB
MD5: 2a4a5d5690eaba6b498b25cac5ba47f2 SHA-1: 2976ef93eede1e0a0878cf5f38bac5644be9473f SHA-256: d1ab1fa0554d5b8208a2137e98fb74fcf2841cb46c038c00da28c7f394466a03
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE objects, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive indicates that the embedded object will be activated automatically. The presence of objdata suggests that the exploit payload is contained within the RTF file itself. While no specific script was extracted, the exploit's typical function is to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000018ea.bin
96328e98b9c91e174e5f1ebc44b619212175acfbebc55897b11af74a53c93e59
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x18EA 1475 bytes