Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d195463c10190f83…

MALICIOUS

PDF

82.6 KB Created: 2021-09-17 09:45:57 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-11-21
MD5: e1d867463738b26465a2c64f1d6b1ca8 SHA-1: 5f0516723bb70455fad6f7a875175814150c6892 SHA-256: d195463c10190f83d33c11aa2f04aaf0297fae4fc6669f208c57f051994b425d
212 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file was detected as malicious by ClamAV and a machine learning classifier, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent. The file contains numerous embedded URIs pointing to compromised CMS upload directories and disposable hosting, suggesting it functions as a link farm to distribute further malicious content. Embedded JavaScript streams are also present, which could be used to execute malicious code or redirect users to phishing sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9974

Heuristics 10

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://alshuka.ps/ckfinder/userfiles/files/roxilewelogiwufokuwu.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://moraure.net/js/ckfinder/userfiles/files/22621775308.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vmkstroi.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/322ac599fd9bf6fa1644386c39cf3d9a/rakiwafonefixefabidav.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://deesudcoolingtower.com/userfiles/file/39954143909.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://facyt.com.ar/ckfinder/userfiles/files/55270472846.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vincityhomes.vn/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/t15abiq6mkqkq2ie8q45orahob/limulugaripa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://g-ortho.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1612f555377038---24884669414.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://poliinc.com/upload/files/gadevudurutajadopuxalu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vigen12.com/userfiles/file/60317167009.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sirikulsteel.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613d5667ef003---bajobimabunojamul.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.azulejositurry.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ggcona6m885ijfmeei5gve7he7/tixenomevekogetitif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.iieng.org/editor/ckfinder/userfiles/files/66745970924.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://duszek-lasu.pl/userfiles/file/93976036369.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://chief-moving.com/editor_upload/file/reziwurona.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wdnederland.nl/file/mexoforimutudogadapufil.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tpdw.pl/userfiles/file/64523992124.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cottoneauto.it/userfiles/files/tururogidezinun.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://binarbaidtrading.com/public_html/userfiles/file/25754472778.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://objetivovender.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16140c8be3dc6a---36921745332.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://79.170.40.182/boothtastic.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161377d1642572---fizuxi.pdfPDF link annotation
    • http://www.lbf-cosmetics.com/website/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1614170a0d8ba1---vuteselebulubavajoxag.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://posuni.com/userfiles/file/luwukof.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vyveva.eu/UserFiles/File/2937325386.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ceilford.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/91c91433742917d7bc93add1283f544b/dupipoxufibuwad.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/FevRqgeaUVY/uplcv?utm_term=how+do+i+send+pictures+from+iphone+to+androidPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000dd8d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDD8D 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0000f59f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF59F 17560 bytes
SHA-256: 89d961fa4b37b46c1c2e1b477fa85d911e1141f1884b237f863fd9c4d556f5f7
font_02_sfnt_off000122d6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x122D6 11016 bytes
SHA-256: f7265711058d0c007241d16f87c17928e0b66f82d5f71b2099dc82b89e405432

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