RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · d18b221c75bce6a2

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

37.5 KB First seen: 2022-12-23

MD5: a731d056f2a4fe399d5d079d13dabc22 SHA-1: d783e2ba0cc1f829d107d47029ccb20dee14d9fb SHA-256: d18b221c75bce6a2c9be6386c0b6f72c6bf7ccd366f7aa9c83fbd536b3106f3a

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 Malicious Link T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', which is a common tactic to bypass macro security. The presence of ".objdata" and ".objupdate" sections, along with the Equation Editor heuristic, strongly suggests an exploit attempt to execute arbitrary code.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000058c4.bin` `ddb36dc58d5cda48ea5a2693866692ca49433904f7559a03d853939421efe8d8`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x58C4	1768 bytes

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