Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d175ef994c1e0680…

MALICIOUS

RTF

9.1 KB First seen: 2019-05-31
MD5: 253200b32e8920c91c4f1e574e724b71 SHA-1: ce6302c73182ccc0b9c5862b4274b912572ec3ef SHA-256: d175ef994c1e0680f0c8c7fde6aec532f3ecb202f00f1063968a033580e4ffd0
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating exploitation of a known vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The \objupdate directive forces the activation of this object, leading to arbitrary code execution. The decoded OLE object data is the most significant IOC, likely containing the shellcode or initial payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000174c.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x174C 1627 bytes
SHA-256: 7fa567be84d5d634f5cbe68eafc31f65970130b2e243b22299349eaa5d061ef8