Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d175ecb50060b747…

MALICIOUS

PDF

83.0 KB Created: 2021-09-08 06:13:34 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-05
MD5: 8cb8fc92dd64c2a4f21590ad863d43b1 SHA-1: ba62e8327ebb58dbe43685656ba56e4db11bc731 SHA-256: d175ecb50060b74715fa43e271d7bcffbb4f0b7d6628ef96d4fd61de972d7a3e
264 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The PDF contains multiple heuristics indicating it is a malicious phishing document, including lures for browser extension installation and clipboard command execution. It also hosts numerous links to potentially compromised WordPress sites, suggesting a distribution mechanism for further payloads. The ML classifier strongly flagged this PDF as malicious, and ClamAV detected it as a phishing trojan.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9977

Heuristics 10

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://garglob.ru/uplcv?utm_term=manually+install+win+10+updates PDF link annotation
    • https://www.avenueroadadvertising.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160f189a62e33d---donagolugogakufejimuxevab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.celso.org/download/40210041770.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.farmaciapenil.es/userfiles/files/jawavuloneliwuz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.bufolari.com/public/immagini/file/texixukekuz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xetnghiemadndanang.com/upload/userfiles/files/nojoxakujuzobiperewolin.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://taeguektour.com/FileData/ckfinder/files/20210823_FBF8945CA03BA08B.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mgmkt.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16084fbdbaf038---magenojupalut.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://shopsuathientu.com/uploads/userfiles/file/nogemudan.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://businesslife.com/content/file/batefububetupiroweg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://104.156.58.56/~web2inbox/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1610e69f9e8d33---fisuxizoxarata.pdfPDF link annotation
    • http://midiabyz.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/cb59e084269363b98bcd3f765f678080/beresijulobarewarugewok.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://miamiuniquelimo.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606d2db1ddff2---tiveba.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bet-balance.com/userfiles/file/91741895480.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tokyoto.pl/UserFiles/file/87674719511.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vtracauto.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608f504f3e4ff---85254155495.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.icodar.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608dc28979377---53869019045.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://asupuro.com/upload/save_image/files/99523825889.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wanyuantemple.tw/userfiles/file/91270667603.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://grandegroup.net/files/69663283400.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.rosebankprimary.co.za/inc/ckfinder/userfiles/files/99177737302.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://geo-decouverte.kenamedia.ch/ck/ckfinder/userfiles/files/visubi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://svs-pm.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16115543ff24e6---purojizoketabexenized.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tai-group.com/upload/files/jotuxokaxigiki.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e10e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE10E 17260 bytes
SHA-256: 2892c08d4daefbdb2068361e0a510d70bd2564e3866b95b260dad6b4ab9f6879
font_01_sfnt_off00010d87.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10D87 10632 bytes
SHA-256: e13f87eb6c0b91fa230286bd7af42a394d933b6ef577c773c42c2d64b07bf7ab
font_02_sfnt_off00012618.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12618 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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