Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d167c5fbc8fdfddb…

MALICIOUS

PDF

7.9 KB
MD5: 4936cc1e0f9a0628e17bdf8fed8a3602 SHA-1: 3f4490fc8769839542ed91b0bec096f0128e31e4 SHA-256: d167c5fbc8fdfddb7bd59a808aa3af9f108c587bda08dec96fd3b541fce5060a
456 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.001 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious File

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that exploits multiple Adobe Reader vulnerabilities, including CVE-2009-0927, CVE-2007-5659, and CVE-2008-2992. The JavaScript is heavily obfuscated and uses custom Base64 decoding to unpack further layers. This process ultimately leads to the execution of a malicious payload, as indicated by ClamAV detections of Pdf.Dropper.Agent-1828973 and Js.Exploit.Shellcode-18 on extracted artifacts. The primary attack vector is the exploitation of these known PDF vulnerabilities.

Heuristics 11

  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-1828973 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-1828973
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • OpenAction trigger high PDF_OPENACTION
    PDF has an /OpenAction — code runs automatically when opened
  • eval() call high PDF_EVAL
    eval() found — commonly used for obfuscated exploit execution (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • String.fromCharCode medium PDF_FROMCHARCODE
    String.fromCharCode found — used to construct payload strings dynamically (matched inside decoded stream)
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0009_000.js
f6b972557c6ba42edece450475a40f10c80a8df706ffdf244e5f8f2e86912cda
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 9 at offset 0xD6 19616 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 4 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
custom_b64_stage_000.js
97159591aa2ff34f6d5c1a5ba5f673775f05e85c3aea041cc09c68e8a776693d
deobfuscated-js custom Base64 decoded JavaScript layer 2 (PDF /JS object 9) at offset 0x436 10527 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Js.Exploit.Shellcode-18
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 9 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).