Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d1304591cc7db437…

MALICIOUS

PDF

71.6 KB Created: 2021-06-28 22:03:29 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 02abf435c4ba1a463b39326f2ecd6e43 SHA-1: f9143465ab603c423aaf6e4fd43c9c2c6fb9014b SHA-256: d1304591cc7db4378c860234ff5b368d21559fb0fa57475db6225ff60affbc7c
176 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF file was detected as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier. It contains numerous links, many pointing to compromised WordPress sites and IP addresses, suggesting it functions as a link farm to distribute malicious content or phish for information. The presence of multiple PDF_URI and PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM heuristics further supports this attack pattern.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9965

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://aquaticlandscape.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607348865b26e---pejonuwitavevir.pdf
    • https://www.kngroup.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607629bc1e3db---xaluwigitatuketosotav.pdf
    • http://acecaalcoy.com/userfiles/file/28496385246.pdf
    • https://www.davidwoodpersonnel.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b203121e243---30904637743.pdf
    • https://wurstfargo.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/4966ea3b15707f5fef13b640d9bff3a8/dutojopubopowarili.pdf
    • https://a2designbg.com/userfiles/file/xakegos.pdf
    • https://zweiund40.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/6d2g599kc1caut1varbib0r347/61947257273.pdf
    • http://pphu-joanna.pl/fckpliki/file/rewakitamuxidumigezav.pdf
    • http://104.156.58.56/~web2inbox/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b98df268fe9---xamefaliwidopab.pdf
    • http://staging.impactredevelopment.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160784945ea8b9---45031965493.pdf
    • http://princeworldwide.com/multimedia/userfiles/file/vulizi.pdf
    • http://training-solutions.ro/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607de7c7e5907---63183687419.pdf
    • http://www.driftime.ee/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c97599e16cd---2441015287.pdf
    • https://rmdschoolandcollege.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0u1deu6rtrscim9qujo91cld94/fefakewoxujezemarawap.pdf
    • http://www.kidnuri.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160cef1bd9e3ee---zepojizaxanuvekodit.pdf
    • http://ottotech.center/userfiles/file/43535768555.pdf
    • https://dcmheavyequipment.com/admin/images/file/pepixadixorimowiviv.pdf
    • https://www.areatransfers.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607e202fd39d7---kamon.pdf
    • https://rfcorporation.net/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/26b76c3cc9c931fd25ed94c6b0891152/rosixulukafolezibikoxo.pdf
    • https://joebalogh.ro/imagini_ws/14223094845.pdf
    • http://evevoyance.fr/adh/.-/file/sasikefuxegilotitik.pdf
    • https://alkhairi.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/71fe68c60b0fd0839a57b36352fdd5ec/givadu.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/1KS0DP0cxss/uplcv?utm_term=real+numbers+in+10th+class
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000b976.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB976 16792 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000d188.bin
8b19f798731ab8063caa32bc694ebc39b8b7695f40a88c64c1d8e5ce01154eca
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD188 15416 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000f8d4.bin
60b792f8caf0b8080944cacbd31e3ca0844b4b1dc5600e39d19c8443c99c4134
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF8D4 10836 bytes