Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCM — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d11e2cf4ed7ea105…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCM

145.3 KB Created: 2020-10-14 02:16:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 34323c983012c91d3ee94c0ab70aea92 SHA-1: ec815dcb76051ce1ad4c377a1843cf6d2a1fd8c9 SHA-256: d11e2cf4ed7ea10569e35e68f2af44f852df3080744351451906a84f9e2ee48a
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

This OOXML document contains VBA macros, specifically a Document_Open macro that utilizes the Shell() function. This indicates the document is designed to execute arbitrary code upon opening. The presence of a suspicious extracted artifact with a long encoded blob further suggests the macro is intended to download and execute a second-stage payload. No specific family could be identified, but the technique is common for initial access.

Heuristics 5

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
f37f8dadf13ff019606752d2872223da5eb21d60e5bc86485467bface90ccc4f		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1673 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 4 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
5950fb838052d6bf47001d07fa1667b9a2fc770e523087e29370798d1416b556		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 9728 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 4 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

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