Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d11c5921aad261c2…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.31 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-10-02
MD5: 48f1a27303c4fdb921e068b5f0354737 SHA-1: 61df8b542ba1f0e413317fa4fba9bf2220731b15 SHA-256: d11c5921aad261c2d8b4eeb98aa56204714497ce7b62230ed610a1bda0c1309a
272 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.001 Malicious Link: Malicious Link T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking: Component Object Model Hijacking T1187 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample contains an embedded Equation Editor OLE object that exploits CVE-2017-11882. This object contains a secondary embedded PDF which, in turn, contains a direct link to a payload. The VBA macros are present but contain no executable statements, indicating they are not the primary execution vector. The PDF's direct payload link points to https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com, suggesting a download and execution chain.

Heuristics 8

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
1dc886478dda97c2074d6f6d0fa95c2e63097e002201baa47dbf66e414ac4e94		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD00037097/Ole10NatIVe 1676 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00071800.pdf
a3abe9d45ffc64e51e245e37945cc3c27b618c00db36005dd3d9004a420611b2		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x71800 906240 bytes
stream_004_off00005f60.bin
2998a126f4fa11ceb265371a5f7968ec18bc4692a32631a544232dc74040021f		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x5F60 252488 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001000.pdf
5d70ae003e5b5c5096af65f822f73e91d1ffe36e7a36e2f09adf6a71c0b59c00		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1000 1367040 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006600.pdf
5d04b50834a869559ae329cfd6238549c1fdbca0fc0138f918246e82a4fe3038		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6600 1345024 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00029200.pdf
f036363f760040a134c2e1733d57427f4e7c613f9bfa9d33399a3edfbbb4b1ce		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x29200 1202688 bytes

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