Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d10727076cdbe6b8…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

17.8 KB Created: 2022-02-11 13:20:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: b881d02e1f9b3e7f66f0d9d4a1656c67 SHA-1: 366343a03ed25ed22151b19c44e85e7f31bb2aad SHA-256: d10727076cdbe6b82f039039461c0e1eea5627847097d45e37786693008c5f29
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Service Execution: Visual Basic T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample contains a Document_Open macro that executes a series of commands via cmd.exe. The macro attempts to download a file from 'hanoi.com' using curl, decodes it using certutil, and then executes the decoded file as 'quyet.exe'. This indicates a downloader functionality, aiming to fetch and run a second-stage payload. The VBA script's obfuscation and the use of LOLBins like certutil and curl are common in malware delivery.

Heuristics 7

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • LOLBin reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_LOLBIN
    LOLBin reference in VBA
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • cmd.exe reference in VBA high OLE_VBA_CMD
    cmd.exe reference in VBA
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
b96e7feead53715eef7801b72bd651d9c96840f3401e2d0588268b028aadec4c		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 2198 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
6675d8734c98a9e545f81d1ff8ee28f6f8a281a416778a2cdad50213056f4c83		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 16384 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

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