Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d0fe3f57feb5d609…

MALICIOUS

PDF

38.5 KB Created: 2020-11-06 12:36:21 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-01-23
MD5: 33b0127d4fd6d9a7f4d14125fbec3785 SHA-1: 6b4352a9170359c92bfd497de9ccc9b40005627f SHA-256: d0fe3f57feb5d609926c1232e399a596ec01d5eaf73ea7dadf3c3b499d284970
186 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 7

  • Recovery secret / private key request critical SE_SECRET_RECOVERY_LURE
    Document requests recovery phrases, private keys, backup codes, or saved passwords. Requests for these secrets in a document are high-risk.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) or Microsoft license-boilerplate documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffset.ru/aws?keyword=autozone+com+rebates+online PDF link annotation
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4389366/normal_5f96cbd0afc9b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4421058/normal_5f9ad6f25ffe2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4374522/normal_5f89e5a298e74.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rawunixu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134527334/5797810.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4373757/normal_5f91ad3ba6df3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lilawowawumoxo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453384/tapaxuruduxu_mazilumolime_musonader.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bizumoku.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681494/0faff7542dd1100.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vipapesad.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134369303/e8b02b75.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://voxapinave.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740917/7119677.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369629/normal_5f895c79a37a4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gomemetunugup.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132712315/pezeduzadawu-xojixig.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bidutujube.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134403342/4281772.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/4fceed48-7b17-4d54-bbc7-d4f731ea71e0/94318612759.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/afd0f267-1e15-483b-9d96-c2790d75ddd4/jimezuwafilakuwimoda.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005862.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5862 5124 bytes
SHA-256: 015e5c909c906f44a612e0f7944b5b660c20e991fd6cc2328aa9cb1fe75270b3
font_01_sfnt_off000069bb.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x69BB 10528 bytes
SHA-256: e8adb80677a224b6f6216ff7e3a7cfcbd44dbff6f62b4f9ec70510556a2ecdbb

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