MALICIOUS
500
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects, specifically exploiting the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution when the embedded object is activated. The presence of PE headers within the hex-encoded data further suggests a malicious payload is hidden within the object. The file is classified as malicious due to this exploit.
Heuristics 12
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Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOREquation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
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CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
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Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATEDRTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
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ClamAV: Rtf.Exploit.CVE_2017_11882-6584355-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Rtf.Exploit.CVE_2017_11882-6584355-1
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PE header (with DOS stub) in hex data critical RTF_MZ_HEXHex-encoded PE (MZ + DOS stub) found inside RTF — likely an embedded executable payload
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\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATERTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
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Package object class high RTF_OBJCLASS_PACKAGEOLE Package object — can wrap arbitrary files
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Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEXRTF contains ~1156KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
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Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATARTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
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Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMBRTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
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OlePres presentation stream in RTF OLE object medium RTF_OLEPRES_STREAMRTF contains an embedded OLE object with an OlePres presentation stream. OlePres is an OLE presentation marker and is not enough on its own to identify CVE-2025-21298.
Extracted artifacts 3
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
objdata_00_off000000ef.bin |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0xEF | 578261 bytes |
SHA-256: 66e1cde50976ee95b3f4e3219e62a458e27c002e9b927cc514003a7ca6f3d134 |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PUSH_STRING, SC_STR_VIRTUALPROTECT Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: kernel32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, VirtualProtect Carved artifact entropy is 7.55, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
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objdata_01_off0011a6e8.bin |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0x11A6E8 | 3980 bytes |
SHA-256: f6a81f8be332e34c8d36ea9f961a2a044b0feb685e15ab11a17c6987849d2579 |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): cmd.exe /c%tmp%\hhhh.exe &��D$,f-Q���%
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objdata_02_off0011c92e.bin |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0x11C92E | 3546 bytes |
SHA-256: 47e63c006eb81ff94d98dab80b056f719ae51297def7f0017cf8c6718d1f684f |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): cmd.exe /c%tmp%\hhhh.exe AC
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