Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d0e038febe41de55…

MALICIOUS

PDF

46.6 KB Created: 2020-11-07 03:10:51 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-05
MD5: ea92036449802123db68fca202f5ff20 SHA-1: dcc33b3c311ee16b87632ed994e65282f03b9e6a SHA-256: d0e038febe41de556600bb4eed9afd696fd44ef42d73d2086be20a61ff289cdc
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document was flagged as malicious by an ML classifier. The file embeds a large number of external links characteristic of an SEO link farm and routes users through malicious redirector infrastructure. Specific URLs and indicators for this sample are listed in the indicators section.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/123?keyword=chain+chronicle+ep+1+dub In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4385412/normal_5f98a190a899e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dududisekit.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134348084/36a96b88.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tenikekiso.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775729/kusazututon-xaziz-ninujolofofe-povazunezo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://judamuguduvawa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134352100/vimin_begatotarilap.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4377678/normal_5f9dbe8b15b28.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://juragubiv.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874328/vegawel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4413455/normal_5f9c4387993f0.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4406482/normal_5f94a6bfd4583.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4365619/normal_5f86f8f25f5e4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fakimodixoto.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739088/80bd6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/nademopor/30484070047.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sifuwel.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/vimuxojafagezulu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kizikobir.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/xitovo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000057da.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x57DA 5080 bytes
SHA-256: 94797e3d8a67880fa82948844d37044d01948512243970ab5361a78444ace90c
font_01_sfnt_off00006911.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6911 10532 bytes
SHA-256: e0b19eb49856d9ff59eea392f042ba044ff226548ee4e97a3530dc7ca6a2fac8
font_02_sfnt_off00008cf5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8CF5 20104 bytes
SHA-256: 2ade5e488bbbf08ba72bc4033f2e7162e416d79b6029c4c817b37e6ace474812