Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d0ca583d06fdfdad…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

273.8 KB Created: 2022-08-10 07:36:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2022-08-11
MD5: ab53a186f3145d98971e1f1a9af08fa3 SHA-1: c8bb8a8280c265c445abaf99f351c6f85ea2e04a SHA-256: d0ca583d06fdfdad5f5db73ecb88e0036736b8cebfee66e117a8edf7d52c22e5
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The file contains an embedded OLE object, identified as a risky file type that drops an auto-executable payload. Static triage also flagged a suspicious extracted artifact, specifically an OLE object. These findings indicate the document's primary purpose is to deliver a secondary executable payload to the victim's system.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
0b74ab68f8ef56ccf8b418a93e7626a2052e8e0b84a31ce814df9db45005b42d		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 241152 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.97, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
c4b3c18fdd99aa43bdfb82ecf5bead570d16c1166a590365e90fc02990481c0e		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 236118 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
1665c8aa2ca165426ac1bc9ee57c7e937ae7c75a890d7836c2a9a2f99994ef6a		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image3.emf 5464 bytes

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