Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d0c10ba7f4461108…

MALICIOUS

PDF

48.8 KB Created: 2020-11-05 02:13:50 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-15
MD5: a3a089ea94ae82ba696d31f62335f9e3 SHA-1: e98b83188a9e3a685e1a184b0c587fa8c13cff51 SHA-256: d0c10ba7f44611088137b9cc7436edbfb05539c1197f25c460750c56268c2c58
184 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/aws?keyword=what+is+the+peculiar+institution+apush In PDF document text
    • https://sojutobifedurex.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134588439/dawudamukobi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jilibawijoza.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134363321/3431077.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nifazupu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134507595/1049683.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sojutobifedurex.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134588439/lijiluras.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xifobosakup.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815359/57e9e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4410432/normal_5f9e0c806558d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://seforurusux.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/1/134131879/389dc2e52516fc6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/sifawekujiki/88797400876.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/e66585e3-1358-48c1-b87f-63b12b21a16b/91457300624.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006b7f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6B7F 5032 bytes
SHA-256: 5c0082621804c527d8c032696515b0a7ced4588b0c2cbfec6e10fe6bcf617cc4
font_01_sfnt_off00007ca2.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7CA2 10600 bytes
SHA-256: 07eab26eae259f9307c60c1b1c7771b575e2a78cc1d11ad166eb6cc8432d97e5
font_02_sfnt_off0000a0d2.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xA0D2 16508 bytes
SHA-256: 623a44766666e5ff746b525eb06a0b860752d22624ff6e26debfa6a43f6566c1