Office (OLE) malware analysis — malicious · d0b93ab42c4809c8

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

837.0 KB Created: 2003-07-13 10:04:24 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2020-02-04

MD5: a2ec185c38de225033c7859390b13012 SHA-1: 7008d3f380ef025893b92dadbf298591c3f5a149 SHA-256: d0b93ab42c4809c817bea1c418aad2d0c3dba3247421485020d9af35750e2728

582 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

This OLE document contains an embedded PE executable and exhibits suspicious characteristics such as a large slack anomaly and references to process creation and file downloading APIs. ClamAV detected it as Win.Trojan.Agent-6943819-1. The document body states 'This is an Antivirus Bait file,' which is a common lure to disguise malicious content.

Heuristics 13

ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Agent-6943819-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Trojan.Agent-6943819-1
Reference to URLDownloadToFile API critical SC_STR_URLDOWNLOAD

Reference to URLDownloadToFile API
Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE

MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
Embedded Office document has suspicious static findings critical EMBEDDED_OFFICE_CHILD_STATIC_TRIAGE

A CFB/OLE Office document was found inside another file type and its carved contents matched Office exploit or payload heuristics. This catches wrapped exploit documents where the top-level file routes to a PE, archive, or generic scanner instead of Office.
Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS

Reference to CreateProcess API
Reference to ShellExecute API high SC_STR_SHELLEXEC

Reference to ShellExecute API
Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY

Reference to LoadLibrary API
Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS

Reference to GetProcAddress API
OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY

OLE file is 857,102 bytes but its declared streams total only 12,288 bytes — 844,814 bytes (99%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
Reference to VirtualProtect API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALPROTECT

Reference to VirtualProtect API
CFB header with no readable streams medium OLE_PARSE_EMPTY_STREAMS

The file begins with a valid OLE2/CFB header but exposes no directory streams. A non-empty compound document with an unreadable directory is anomalous — it is seen with truncated/corrupt files and, more importantly, with content deliberately shifted off byte boundaries to defeat parsers while the host application still recovers the object.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL http://ocsp.verisign.com0 In document text (OLE body)
- http://crl.verisign.com/ThawteTimestampingCA.crl0In document text (OLE body)
- http://crl.verisign.com/tss-ca.crl0In document text (OLE body)
- http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CodeSignPCA2.crl0OIn document text (OLE body)
- http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/CodeSignPCA2.crt0In document text (OLE body)
- http://office.microsoft.comIn document text (OLE body)
- https://www.verisign.com/rpaIn document text (OLE body)
- https://www.verisign.com/rpa01In document text (OLE body)
- http://crl.verisign.com/pca3.crl0In document text (OLE body)
- http://CSC3-2004-crl.verisign.com/CSC3-2004.crl0DIn document text (OLE body)
- https://www.verisign.com/rpa0In document text (OLE body)
- http://CSC3-2004-aia.verisign.com/CSC3-2004-aia.cer0In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`embedded_office_0000660a.exe`	embedded-pe	Office MZ+PE at offset 0x660A	830980 bytes
SHA-256: `390289b856ce2be7977bdd1f9d61ffdfeb4d44bffb38f132cc6b36d756e2cd6d`
Detection ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Agent-6943819-1 Obfuscation or payload: likely Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): cmdln
`embedded_office_off00003605.ole`	embedded-office	Embedded OLE/CFB Office body inside ole container at offset 0x3605	843273 bytes
SHA-256: `b1e0b10f22eab507cb4839aa388281946a70e068173353d94f06d3efd20da925`
Detection ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Agent-6943819-1 Obfuscation or payload: likely Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): cmdln
`embedded_office_off00006480.ole`	embedded-office	Embedded OLE/CFB Office body inside ole container at offset 0x6480	831374 bytes
SHA-256: `413164597d9b8a2deb7e397f806f90f4961dba5f79c6854045c5342a844252c5`
Detection ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Agent-6943819-1 Obfuscation or payload: likely Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): cmdln
`embedded_office_0000660a_1.exe`	embedded-pe	Office MZ+PE at offset 0x660A	395907 bytes
SHA-256: `6e58316624363c7106791c85b77c8736bb626964135ae404a1161e4273df2319`
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): cmdln
`embedded_office_off0006a381.ole`	embedded-office	Embedded OLE/CFB Office body inside ole container at offset 0x6A381	422029 bytes
SHA-256: `2d75e5ca8b27c96ef75e9c7202db12425a249eb262b08589475d30d70c33f1e3`
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): cmdln
`embedded_office_off0006d986.ole`	embedded-office	Embedded OLE/CFB Office body inside ole container at offset 0x6D986	408200 bytes
SHA-256: `b6d5bc0ae576f0bd1cbf2fe36b31a2525e6298bec49db4b57e5f849ead91326d`
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): cmdln

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