Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d09fdd7a4719ff46…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

24.4 KB
MD5: 0e0541600621c3c0a4fd734339339dd7 SHA-1: ba02d819232470a792b632964a0edd0d5d60474b SHA-256: d09fdd7a4719ff4630659e5755ae4c69000e1b93075a32d9c92982e5c6b54d45
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object specifically identified as an Equation Editor object, triggering heuristics for CVE-2017-11882. The presence of \objupdate and \objdata sections indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated, likely leading to the execution of malicious code. This exploit is commonly used as a delivery mechanism for further payloads.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000020db.bin
15aeb0a3c4c3dc0fc175e0e06c44b34953bd3673c0f4bf382139b0696acea7ee
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x20DB 1615 bytes