Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d073902b673d9243…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

323.0 KB Created: 2022-08-05 07:57:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2022-08-09
MD5: ff5593f90f9e4680f5f972cc611715ad SHA-1: ea263809814e4535869ff400cc672f4bc8cd2900 SHA-256: d073902b673d9243ec93d615a42ae11e048c4913ca9b2163bc578d1224cdb84e
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The sample is a malicious OOXML document containing an embedded OLE object. This object is identified as a risky file package that drops an auto-executable payload, specifically a JAR file. The presence of this embedded object strongly suggests the document's intent is to deliver and execute a secondary malicious payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
3c1b6460c4c625b09af0c4f9bdd2777521e45c92b86f2ee2fcccb9e689c50756		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 145408 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.95, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
3101fdf2ad6a0dabc041477d64f9d11be00c968a32c7d35a7d6da980aee457d6		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 140915 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
92e3ceb595b411be9ce9c79ad82ae59c7eae12dbadfe86aa0e20f35a10c03871		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image3.emf 5464 bytes

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