Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d06aa8b239387714…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

13.0 KB Created: 1601-01-01 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word 6.0 First seen: 2012-06-14
MD5: ee84bfc3b995ec6d1320ec5c7bce8ef1 SHA-1: e9dfadfa12fad27776d9f32d54924d7746ee1b54 SHA-256: d06aa8b2393877144710230c5ef5d17600808ff7cf2a06ed16a1057fb9ce00b8
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic

The file is identified as malicious by ClamAV with the signature 'Doc.Trojan.Helper-1'. It contains legacy WordBasic auto-exec markers like 'AutoClose', indicating potential macro execution. The document body text, though seemingly innocuous, uses terms like 'System Administrator' and file paths, which could be part of a lure to execute malicious macros.

Heuristics 4

  • ClamAV: Doc.Trojan.Helper-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Trojan.Helper-1
  • Embedded Office document has suspicious static findings critical EMBEDDED_OFFICE_CHILD_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A CFB/OLE Office document was found inside another file type and its carved contents matched Office exploit or payload heuristics. This catches wrapped exploit documents where the top-level file routes to a PE, archive, or generic scanner instead of Office.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • CFB header with no readable streams medium OLE_PARSE_EMPTY_STREAMS
    The file begins with a valid OLE2/CFB header but exposes no directory streams. A non-empty compound document with an unreadable directory is anomalous — it is seen with truncated/corrupt files and, more importantly, with content deliberately shifted off byte boundaries to defeat parsers while the host application still recovers the object.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_office_off00001c80.ole embedded-office Embedded OLE/CFB Office body inside ole container at offset 0x1C80 6016 bytes
SHA-256: 7854f34627ed445b3782fdcfe58f11db52e6d658f592c9a5aab3be4444d4a422

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