Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d0698c027a438ba2…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

24.1 KB First seen: 2022-12-05
MD5: 48676b4fb82a290e0e09c380419f9066 SHA-1: df79c2c0a59aa6bc6c79491005ba0ba6b41d1bfa SHA-256: d0698c027a438ba2209c00bff417fe5d5d2828a130b7b7cb44e9c1388352bd44
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, a known exploit technique. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing' to bypass security measures. The presence of ".objdata" and ".objupdate" sections further indicates the exploitation of OLE object vulnerabilities.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000047d0.bin
9801d945ba42e2a0144f764160e0f845689999fd689767e66e7e30291908cd31
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x47D0 1428 bytes