RTF malware analysis — malicious · d04b4aee3b062e68

MALICIOUS

RTF

34.7 KB First seen: 2023-07-20

MD5: bb3e49f4f8eae71e756ba49386a7f00e SHA-1: 785f2640df61cce7a437c8c1a4eabb80a634b68f SHA-256: d04b4aee3b062e68e9c35402495cf1d40ded53c7dadcdb35590640342932170c

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object and utilizes an Equation Editor exploit, indicated by the RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and RTF_OBJDATA heuristics. The SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristic suggests the document prompts the user to enable editing, a common tactic for macro-based malware delivery. The document body presents as an academic assignment to mask its malicious intent.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00004083.bin` `8b6aa31416ae9417a193fe388142949bcace10eab23d0541947934d4bbe62797`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x4083	1398 bytes

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