Malicious Office (OOXML) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d0271e58ebd7fa92…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .XLSX

85.3 KB Created: 2020-09-20 21:17:44 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 16.0300
MD5: ad91e3245310073eb3288dcea8749808 SHA-1: 95b3b6b73ab649c0d9f93c85b4c6706e248348c1 SHA-256: d0271e58ebd7fa92a8a30f5f4df2c106b98b14873fb0a7fa7fc81a6dfb3526d3
188 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic for Applications T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an Excel file containing Excel 4.0 macros, which is a known technique for delivering malicious payloads. The macros utilize dangerous functions like EXEC, indicating an intent to download and execute a second-stage payload from the unknown URL http://buydomainnameuk.com/img/pole.exe. The presence of a hidden sheet further supports the malicious intent by attempting to conceal its operations.

Heuristics 5

  • Excel 4.0 macro sheet (1 sheet(s)) critical OOXML_XLM_MACROSHEET
    Spreadsheet contains an Excel 4.0 (XLM) macro sheet — XLM was a major Office malware vector during 2020-2022 and evaded many VBA-focused controls before Microsoft tightened XLM defaults. Even legitimate XLM use is rare in modern workbooks.
  • Excel 4.0 Auto_Open defined name critical OOXML_XLM_AUTOOPEN_DEFINEDNAME
    Workbook defines _xlnm.Auto_Open or _xlnm.Auto_Close while containing an XLM macro sheet. This is the OOXML/XLSB auto-execution shape for Excel 4.0 macros.
  • Dangerous XLM formula APIs: EXEC critical OOXML_XLM_DANGEROUS_FN
    Excel 4.0 macro sheet uses formula APIs that call directly into Win32 (=CALL/=EXEC/=REGISTER/=FORMULA). These are the primitives used to download payloads, write files, and start processes from an XLM macro without invoking VBA.
  • Hidden worksheet (veryHidden) low OOXML_HIDDEN_SHEET
    Excel workbook contains 1 hidden sheet(s) — hidden sheets are commonly used to conceal macro code, staging data, or intermediate payload construction
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://buydomainnameuk.com/img/pole.exe
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/spreadsheetml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/excel/2006/main
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/spreadsheetml/2009/9/ac
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/spreadsheetml/2014/revision
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/spreadsheetml/2015/revision2
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/spreadsheetml/2016/revision3
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/spreadsheetml/2016/revision6

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
xlm_sheet_00.xml
51fa531dcd3d1962c992ee85cfc329c10d57701338a450396074a98607cd7392		 xlm-macrosheet OOXML XLM macro sheet: xl/macrosheets/intlsheet1.xml 1992 bytes

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